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Enrique V. Iglesias* 
It goes without saying that it is a source of great 
pleasure and emotion to be back here in what I 
continue to regard as my home, beside my dear 
friend Norberto González, in whose capable 
hands the institution now rests, and Dr. Raúl 
Prebisch, to whom I owe so much and whose 
opinion I value so highly. I am also very pleased 
and moved to be at this meeting for which we all 
worked so hard, which we were preparing so 
hopefully throughout the past year, and which is 
now a reality through the generous presence of 
all those attending. 
We have long felt in ECLAC that there was a 
need for an integrating effort, an exercise of 
collective reflection on the times we are living 
through in Latin America. Two events were 
responsible, however, for precipitating our deci-
sion to hold a meeting for this purpose. One was 
the collapse in recent years of the neo-liberal 
options which seduced so many circles of opinion 
in so many countries in the 1970s. The neo-
liberal solutions came to our countries together 
with important changes in economic outlook, 
and they were imposed through "social engineer-
ing" formulas which were linked in many cases 
with authoritarian political régimes. Those were 
difficult years for the work of ECLAC, when the 
specious lure of such formulae dangled over 
many of ECLAC'S member governments. The col-
lapse of these neo-liberal solutions was a warning 
shock for the region and of course for ECLAC too. 
T h e second event was the crisis of external 
indebtedness —as it has been called— caused by 
the build-up of external debt and by a kind of 
treacherous turnaround in the international cy-
cle marked by extravagant interest rates, the re-
surgence of protectionism, and violent con-
tractions in the inflow of private capital. 
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It then appeared that the time had come to 
make a proper appraisal of the many experiences 
patiently analysed here in ECLAC from the con-
junc tura l and medium- and long-term per-
spectives, which the region had followed from 
day to day and had intimately experienced at the 
intellectual and political levels, ECLAC: decided at 
that point to promote a debate aimed fun-
damental ly at weighing these experiences, 
reconsidering the many signals coming from the 
world economy, and setting afoot an exercise in 
collective reflection by technicians and politi-
cians. I mention these two groups of persons 
because it is essential that this reflection should 
not be confined exclusively to the technical level 
if we really want to give renewed thought to the 
world in which we shall have to live after this 
crisis, which will be novel in many respects be-
cause of its profound asymmetry and complexity 
and which leaves us with every day that passes 
farther away from a theoretical basis for analysis 
and from any clear answers to the problems fac-
ing us. 
Raúl Prebisch referred a little while ago to 
the crisis of the capitalist world,1 which has un-
doubtedly been shrinking the room left to us to 
foresee and anticipate developments. We now 
feel that we are on shaky ground as regards the 
possible bases of an international economy in 
which we could have real confidence. On the 
other hand, the capitalist system has shown an 
unexpectedly great capacity for coping with the 
challenges facing it: during the years I was asso-
ciated with ECLAC I witnessed a number of 
seemingly final crises of capitalism in succession, 
such as the monetary crisis, the gold crisis, the 
energy crisis, and now the debt crisis, which, it 
must be acknowledged, has seemed to be break-
ing up in the last few months. 
'See the article by Raúl Prebisch in this issue of the 
Review. 
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I said earlier that the present crisis is very 
asymmetrical, for without a doubt it would seem 
laughable to assert that the United States or 
Japan were in crisis today. The forecasts, too, are 
very varied. Some observers say that the system is 
on the way to catastrophe, while others maintain 
that we are on the eve of a spectacular rebirth of 
the world economy thanks to the new tech-
nological advances which will imbue the world 
economy with vibrant dynamism. There is no 
doubt that we are living in a novel world, which 
has no precedents in the history of capitalism, 
and which is far beyond the compass of past 
experience and even the intellectual categories 
themselves. One thing which is clear, however, is 
that this crisis is accompanied by a new type of 
international relationship which corresponds 
much more closely to a return to the Schumpete-
rian model than to that of Keynes. In other 
words, those who have worked for so many years 
in the United Nations on a search for the fun-
damental elements of universal regulation, in-
spired directly or indirectly by the thinking of 
Keynes, must now acknowledge that we seem to 
be moving in the direction of a world without 
global regulators: a world ruled exclusively by 
the principle of struggle and competition. 
The same crisis also seems to be visible in 
some respects in the socialist world, where the 
quest for efficiency and for the incorporation of 
new technology and institutional reforms has 
found such novel expression as what is now 
happening in the People's Republic of China. 
In the developing world, too, the crisis has 
asymmetrical features. The flexibility shown in 
recent times by South-East Asia has meant that in 
many countries of that region the situation is 
substantially different from that existing in Latin 
America. On the other hand, the tragic con-
ditions prevailing in Africa are also far removed 
from the crisis affecting us. 
This has caused us to come to the conclusion 
that we really must speak of the special case of 
Latin America, even though there may well be 
some European and African countries in similar 
situations. Our crisis is part of a confused and 
perplexing world; there seem to be no clear 
theoretical bases to go on as there were in the 
1950s, and the crisis is taking place within a set of 
parameters and conjunctions which make it very 
difficult to look ahead. It is this crisis that we 
must tackle theoretically and politically in order 
to cope with challenges which present themselves 
in many different terms and on many levels. 
The dimensions of the Latin American crisis 
oblige us, first of all, to consider the great 
heterogeneity of the region. It is increasingly 
difficult to speak of it as a whole and to give 
global pictures which have any meaning. Think, 
for example, of the difficulty of making a syn-
thesis which includes both continent-sized Brazil 
and the mini-economies of the Caribbean. Even 
so, however, I would say that there are still four 
or five aspects of the Latin American crisis which 
are worth briefly recalling here. 
Firstly, there can be no doubt that even in the 
1970s the collapse of certain Latin American 
growth models could be foreseen. Nobody can 
deny that Latin America has changed consider-
ably, often for the better, and a great deal has 
been done. It is sufficient to glance over some 
social and even economic indicators to realize 
that the Latin America of today is very different 
from that of the past, but nevertheless the fact 
remains that in the 1970s important con-
tradictions were developing between the modern 
and the traditional sectors, between social de-
mands and the capacity to sustain them, and be-
tween the modernization coming from outside 
under the impulse of international trade rela-
tions and the internal articulation which would 
be capable of giving us a self-sustaining growth 
model. 
The external debt worked like an anesthetic, 
and the region was able to avoid facing up to 
many of the effects of these imbalances until the 
end of the 1970s, aided by a degree of financial 
indulgence unprecedented in the economic his-
tory of Latin America. All this filled us with 
doubts about many things and even gave rise to 
many false paradigms. It must be acknowledged 
that we were bedazzled and perplexed and that 
somehow, almost miraculously, many of the 
adverse effects were for the time being, warded 
off. 
An important aspect of the present crisis in 
Latin America and the Caribbean was the finan-
cial indulgence to which I have just referred and 
which had a beguiling influence on all the mod-
els, whether orthodox or heterodox. In some 
cases it was motivated by a legitimate desire to 
increase investment, in others by the irrespon-
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sible determination to adopt extravagant kinds 
of openness to international trade flows. 
The fact is that widespread opening-up took 
place, and the consequence of this was an ex-
ternal situation which has become increasingly 
acute in the 1980s. At the end of the 1970s, Latin 
America's external debt of US$ 200 billion, in a 
situation in which the growth rate of foreign 
trade was considerably higher than that of the 
product, seemed manageable; but in the 1980s, 
interest rates of up to 20%, the drop in the terms 
of trade and all the implications of the contrac-
tion of financial flows changed the prevailing 
climate so suddenly that the debt grew from 
those US$ 200 billion to US$ 350 billion, purely 
as a result of the interest which was accumulat-
ing. Thus, the situation became literally un-
manageable and, in many respects, unforesee-
able. 
Another aspect of the crisis is represented by 
external relations. Nowadays the world is suffer-
ing from a sort of liberal shock which leads us to 
take an in-depth look at North-South relations, 
not just because these relations are marked by 
such phenomena as interest rates but also because 
there can be no doubt that this liberal shock 
which the world is now experiencing means that 
it would be Utopian to suppose that in the next 
few years we can expect a repetition of the ex-
traordinary capital inflows or the booming terms 
of trade of the 1970s. On the contrary, I believe 
that Latin America, as a continent of inter-
mediate development, is going to be abruptly 
involved in the rules of the game deriving from 
the liberal shock and will be increasingly exposed 
to concepts of competition, to the necessity of 
paying more than the odds for the privilege of 
entering markets, and to situations in which its 
position will have to be fiercely competitive and 
set within a context of reciprocity as a formula for 
international trade. Hence, when we call for 
"solidarity" in face of the crisis, we are forgetting 
that the world climate has changed, that the time 
of the Alliance for Progress is past, and that this is 
not the heyday of international co-operation of 
which we have so often dreamt in the United 
Nations. Such international co-operation is being 
increasingly directed towards cases of natural 
disasters, famines and other emergency situa-
tions, because the climate of international rela-
tions today is not the same: it is much crueller and 
much more subject to the play of power relations; 
and this is an objective reality with which we have 
to live. 
Another aspect of the crisis is that it is what I 
would call a crisis of highly ideologized mac-
roeconomics. Thus, in Latin America we have 
witnessed the failure of ideologies that spon-
sored ingenuous formulas of economic populism 
in which social efficiency was betrayed in next to 
no time by economic inefficiency, and we have 
also witnessed doctrines of economic efficiency, 
devoid of popular support and of social efficien-
cy, which have likewise blown to pieces. With 
regard to this reality, so important to economies 
such as ours, which need to command a grasp of 
certain structural aspects of macroeconomics to 
enable them to manage economic and social proj-
ects, the past has but imperfect guidance to 
offer. We must recognize that there have been no 
clear responses of any kind in this respect and 
that we are heavily in arrears with the structural-
ly-oriented handling of macroeconomics in Latin 
America. 
Yet another dimension of the crisis is that it is 
a crisis of ideas, not only in the developing but 
above all in the industrialized countries. I should 
find it hard to suppose that the neo-Keynesian 
equilibria which prevailed up to the beginning of 
the 1980s can be replaced merely by a return, 
pure and simple, to the economic rules in effect 
prior to the 1930s. Perhaps history will prove us 
wrong, but it is hard to believe that the world can 
operate in the presence of these financial im-
balances, these fluctuations in exchange rates 
and these financial flows which transfer re-
sources from one part of our continent to the 
other. It is hard to imagine that this can provide a 
firm foundation for sustained growth. 
Development theory has gone out of fashion 
in the industrial countries; today it is no longer 
represented among the best-sellers in the book-
shops. There has even been some deterioration in 
development theory as we knew it in the 1950s 
and the 1960s when it was predicated by such 
eminent thinkers as Raúl Prebisch, who is here 
with us today. There has even been erosion in 
some models (such as that of Tanzania) of which 
we who work in the United Nations had high 
hopes, while others viewed as egalitarian arche-
types, such as that of China, are changing their 
traditional bases. We have seen a series of 
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approaches fall In the wayside, such as the basic-
needs approach, the critical poverty approach 
and many others which claimed to be an answer 
and now seem to be fading out of the intellectual 
scene, KCLAC, however, as a centre of thinking 
which wishes to remain autonomous, owes a 
large debt to all these models, and it would be 
interesting to go further into the matter. 
The changes which are taking place in the 
theory and practice of socialism itself are attract-
ing our attention every day. We must understand 
why they are occurr ing. We must also un-
derstand why many of our economic models 
have not been capable of assimilating the changes 
taking place in the social structure; why many 
socio-economic models have been unable to in-
fluence the political concepts underlying pres-
ent-day Latin American societies; and why we 
have this divorce between social, political and 
economic models instead of building them into a 
composite whole which would be at once social, 
political and economic. For the tendency to iso-
late solutions is not only doomed to failure but 
will do a serious disservice to the history of Latin 
America. 
This meeting therefore has the basic task of 
progressing in the diagnosis of the crisis, suggest-
ing ways of bringing it under control, reflecting 
on the process of structural change that we must 
face up to in dealing with the liberal shock, and 
making those structural changes which will bring 
us to a dynamic and just society. 
I should like to say a few words on the matter 
of bringing the crisis under control. In these past 
few years we have all lived in the grip of what has 
been the most violent crisis of the past fifty years, 
involving the destruction of capital and un-
imaginable social costs. Perhaps because I come 
from one of those countries in the region that 
have been installed which are increasingly lim-
ited by the loss of autonomy of our internal 
reached in Latin America. 
In every country adjustment mechanisms 
have been installed which are increasingly li-
mited by the loss of autonomy of our internal 
policies due, inter alia, to the external debt and 
inflationary pressures. 
The basic problem in bringing the crisis un-
der control has to do with how to manage the 
external debt. The worst thing that could happen 
to the developed as well as the developing world 
is to think that the problem of the external debt 
has been or is being settled. This message must be 
loud and clear. The debt problem has not been 
sett led, no twi ths tanding the species of in-
ternational complacency with which it is nowa-
days regarded. Not only is there no basic solution 
to the problem, but in some cases it is getting 
worse. And we have to say this with sober im-
partiality and a grave sense of responsibility. 
I believe it is important to state clearly that 
the problem has gradually been managed to 
some extent and deferred, but in the present 
international environment and in the conditions 
which now prevail and those which threaten to 
prevail in the future, it would be a serious mis-
take to think that a solution for it is being found. 
This is why the countries of Latin America de-
mand a political dialogue: not to politicize the 
debt, as has been claimed, or to deny the inevi-
table relationship between debtors and creditors 
or the individuality of each country as regards 
the debt question, but because the problem is of 
such magnitude and puts such constraints on our 
capacity for development that for us it is a highly 
political matter; so it is, however, for the in-
dustrialized countries, for if Latin America's 
economic problems get out of control, that will be 
a political problem for the whole world. 
The second issue to which I attribute fun-
damental importance as regards bringing the 
current crisis under control is inflation. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, there was only one 
country in Latin America with inflation over 
50%; last year, however, there were seven, in 
three of which the rate of inflation was over 
100%, while in some others it was close to or even 
more than 1 000% per annum. The average rate 
of inflation for the region in 1984 was 160%. 
Inflation is an extremely serious matter be-
cause it is not only an economic but also a social 
and political problem. Certainly, we do not value 
stability above all else, as the orthodox ap-
proaches do, but neither are we so naive as to 
suppose that growth can still take place with these 
rates of inflation. What we are saying is that we 
are dealing with a long-standing problem which 
now, however, has very different characteristics 
from before. In the 1950s, we experienced infla-
tion which was ascribable to the structural 
changes entailed by industrialization, urbaniza-
tion and the problems facing the new society that 
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was taking shape in the region. In the 1970s, we 
had so-called "imported" inflation. The inflation 
of today is different; it is closely related to the 
debt issue and has unaccustomed characteristics 
connected with its long duration, our having got 
used to it, and its penetration into the "biology" 
of society. It is linked to such difficult problems 
as that of invalidation of the so-called "in-
flationary tax" by the tightness of the money 
supply, that of systematic indexing, etc. 
I feel sure that in many Latin American 
countries —I do not say all— we are using cate-
gories and formulas to deal with this problem 
which are not in keeping with the different na-
ture of the inflation we are experiencing. I say 
this with total conviction because I believe that 
the present type of inflation calls for more than 
merely economic solutions, since, in addition to 
conditioning the entire outlook for economic 
growth, it also has an impact on the prospects of 
social and political stability. Clearly, this subject is 
of enormous importance in the Latin America of 
today, and in respect of it not only the orthodox 
but also the heterodox schools of thought are in 
arrears. No clear-cut solutions have yet been put 
forward, and I am afraid that we are deluding 
ourselves with many of the adjustments that are 
now being promoted in the region. In all hon-
esty, we cannot say that we are on the right track 
yet in this connection, because the inflation of 
today is structurally different from any of the 
types of inflation that we have seen in the past. 
What is even more important, however, is that it 
has become a basic political issue, and without a 
broad-based internal consensus there is no way to 
eliminate inflation of this type. That is why I can 
say, with legitimate pride, that in my own small 
country, where this problem is on a much more 
modest scale, our attempt at concerted political 
effort, whatever its defects, constitutes a real step 
towards solving the problem. 
I should now like to discuss the question of a 
qualitatively different type of development. I 
think it is dangerous to place too much emphasis 
on this term "qualitatively different". What is 
involved here, and I believe that in saying this I 
am interpreting the documents presented by the 
Secretariat, is to take up once again the long-
standing tradition of ECLAC, i.e., to return to an 
analysis of the actual situation we are dealing 
with, to learn what is really taking place in the 
world, and to reflect upon the new challenges 
being faced, on the basis of that mixture of ideas 
and praxis which has been the great legacy of this 
organization throughout the nearly 40 years of 
its existence. In a sense, this would be a return to 
the experience of ECLAC in the 1950s, i.e., a re-
turn to the close examination of international 
events in order to slowly build up a line of in-
terpretation based on ideas and practice; but we 
cannot put forward broad paradigms which no-
one is now in a position to offer, either in the 
region or in the world. 
A great task of economic, social and political 
modernization of Latin America lies before us. 
Modernization must start off from the basis, first 
of all, of the Latin America that exists today, 
which is a different and extremely complex Latin 
America. Without a doubt, the first step is to 
understand what it is really like. The second is to 
understand the world, because the relationship 
between the centre and the periphery —a con-
cept which this Commission contributed to 
economic thought— is and will continue to be a 
fundamental relationship. It is necessary to un-
derstand our problems in the light of the changes 
that have taken place in this centre-periphery 
relationship, and, in trying to modernize Latin 
America, to give due thought to the domestic 
effort, to the effort to establish regional integra-
tion and to possible new forms of insertion in the 
world setting. This is what we have called mod-
ernization supported by its true pillars: mod-
ernization which, as stated in the documents, is 
both endogenous and selective, so that internal 
linkages may be created within the economy and 
so that it may be protected from fluctuations in 
international trade, prices or finance. 
This surely involves reviving —in a world 
that is entering upon a third industrial revolu-
tion— the high-priority problem of technological 
innovation: an area in which the region must 
unremittingly reflect and work. It also implies 
institutional modernization, which is why the 
Secretariat documents refer so often to the sub-
ject of the State. The modernization of the State 
is perhaps one of the most difficult and most 
political of the challenges that the region will 
have to face in coming years. In so far as social 
modernization is concerned, it seems to me that 
even the very techniques of social policy are be-
ing called in question. Perhaps, with this crisis, 
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conventional social policy has been left behind 
and other ways should be sought of reaching the 
lowest-income sectors of society: that 10% or 20% 
which never receives anything and which is now 
the victim of some of the most underprivileged 
situations in history. With respect to political 
modernization, Aníbal Pinto pointed out, with 
his customary brilliance, how the old mesocratic 
alliances that formed the political base on which 
the Latin America of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 
was built have been breaking down. For many 
reasons, including the autocratic and dictatorial 
political régimes that have sprung up on occasion 
in Latin America, these alliances have been dis-
rupted. I believe that political modernization in-
volves the rebuilding of mesocratic alliances as 
well as broad internal alliances within the coun-
tries, within the public sector, between the public 
and private sectors, and in all areas of society. If 
we are unable to adopt a modern approach to 
politics with a sense of commitment in relation to 
the demands before us, we shall have some very 
difficult times ahead. Meanwhile, the world goes 
on, and just as entire areas have lagged behind in 
the past, the region might well have to pay that 
price if we do not make a great internal effort to 
exer t social and political pressure for the 
advancement of modernization. 
This is the task which lies before us; it entails 
a return to the realities of Latin America and the 
world, the reaffirmation of broad objectives of 
growth, equity, autonomy and integration and, 
especially, recognition of the imperatives of the 
world into which we are becoming integrated 
and the vital need for creativity in dealing with 
these problems, the last-named being an im-
portant facet of this organization's work. 
In speaking about the elements behind such 
an important meeting as this, I have attempted to 
put across my perception of the vital importance 
of this exercise in reflection, which will mark the 
beginning of an ongoing process, and to make it 
clear how important it is that the results of this 
meeting should constitute a true working man-
date for ECLAC, reflecting the contribution of all 
the governments. The intellectual debt which 
Latin America owes to ECLAC will surely grow still 
greater as the region, in the words of Norberto 
Gonzalez, prepares itself to meet, not the past, 
but the future. 
